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PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON EXTREMELY
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In 1976, I was one of three panelists at a meeting of the American
Academy of Pediatrics on the topic: The 1500-gram newborn: Is it
worth it? At that phase in the evolution of neonatology, it was
reasonable to ask whether life-saving medical technologies (LST)
used to rescue and treat imperiled premature newborns was likely to
cause more harm than benefit. Our panel concluded that aggressive
attempts to save the lives of such premature newborns were rarely
successful, and even if they were, the complications and disabilities
caused by the interventions themselves were often severe. Yet I could
understand why neonatologists, urged by anxious parents to save
their premature baby, sought to develop new technologies to push
back the threshold of viability. Even in the absence of LST, some
1500-gram infants survive. For example, in 1976 I had just begun
seeing patients as part of my training to become a psychoanalyst. One
of my first analysands, a clinical psychologist, related to me the
circumstances of her birth. She was the third daughter born to her
mother (a nurse) and her father (a family physician). Born in 1950,
she weighed slightly less than three pounds-approximately 1500
grams. Her parents initially believed that she was so premature and
small that she had virtually no chance to survive. They wrapped her
in a blanket to keep her warm and placed her in the open top drawer
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of a dresser fully expecting her to die soon. But she survived and
thrived without any disabilities. Her parents were surprised but
delighted; she felt both special and lucky.
Another personal experience in 1976 made a deep impression on
me. I was teaching a course on medical ethics to medical students,
residents, and fellows at UCLA, and I asked my students to write a
paper about a case that raised ethical problems for them. One post-
doctoral fellow, who had interned at Johns Hopkins in 1970, narrated
his experience as the primary physician assigned to care for an infant
with Down Syndrome whose parents refused surgery for his duodenal
atresia.1 The student described his emotional agony of standing by
helplessly, ordered to do nothing to save the life of a newborn when
that could have been achieved by a simple surgical intervention. The
young physician wrote passionately not only about saving life but
also about life's intrinsic value. He was still deeply troubled about
what he had not done.
Still another event in 1976 raised profound questions about the
value of life: the Karen Quinlan case.2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that it was legally permissible for Karen's father to tell
the doctors to remove her from the ventilator based on Karen's right
to privacy and a prognosis that she was permanently unconscious.
3
Many observers assumed that she would promptly die. But after the
doctors slowly weaned her from the ventilator, she continued to
breathe on her own. Supported by artificial nutrition and hydration,
she lived for nearly ten more years. Karen's parents objected to the
intrusiveness of the technological machinery necessary to support her
respiration but not the other forms of life-sustaining interventions.
They did not question, even in her persistent vegetative state, the
value of her life. As we all know from Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health4 and especially the many controversies about the
1. See generally James Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires and the Right to Life, PERSP. ON
BioLOGY & MED., Summer 1973, at 529.
2. See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
3. Id. at 662-64.
4. See generally Cruzan v Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
[Vol 25:4
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Terri Schiavo case, 5 vitalism6 -the belief in the sanctity or, at least,
the intrinsic value of, human life (even without consciousness)-is
often reinforced by powerful emotions, fervent advocates, medical
practices, legal rules, and religious doctrines.
Some vitalists base their beliefs upon religious doctrines, such as
the position taken by Pope John Paul II that all persons-from an
unborn fetus to an adult in a vegetative state-have "the inviolable
right of every innocent human being to life.",7 Right-to-life advocates,
whether religious or secular, often echo the value of life expressed by
the late Pope. Others turn to the law for support. Legislation such as
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) 8 and the
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act (BAIPA)9 clearly endorse vitalism.
Some judicial decisions, such as the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision in the Cruzan case, assert that "[l]ife is precious and worthy
of preservation without regard to its quality."'10 The claim that the
right to life is inalienable also expresses a vitalist idea. Secular
versions of vitalism include the notions that human life itself has an
intrinsic and ultimate value regardless of its quality, and that it should
be preserved regardless of costs and consequences. Some medical
practices, such as the use of medical technology to prolong life, even
if it is the only goal of medicine that can be achieved in a particular
case, qualify as a form of vitalism. The strong resistance to
termination of LST by health professionals, as well as patients or
their families, also reflects explicit or implicit vitalist sentiments. One
5. See generally Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers, (Mis)Framing Schiavo As Discrimination
Against Persons with Disabilities, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 789 (2007).
6. See Vitalism - AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1352 (2d ed. 1985).
7. Joseph Card. Ratdnger, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of
Procreation (Feb. 22, 1987) available at httpJ/www.vatican.va/rwmnxcuria/congregations/cfaith/documents/
rc con cfaith doc_19870222_respect-for-human-lifeenhtmi. See also Pope John Paul IM Address ofJohn Paul
Il to the Participants in the International Congress on "Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State:
Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas" (Mar. 20, 2004), available at hup'.vww.vatican.va/holKfther/
johnpaulii/speeches/2004/rmh/dcurents/hffjp-iispe20040320congress-fiamc_en.hml.
8. See generally Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107,
5118 (2006).
9. See generally Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002 (BAIPA), Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116
Stat. 926 (2002).
10. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,419 (Mo. 1988).
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might even consider that psychological forces, such as fear or denial
of death, contribute to deeply rooted and pervasive vitalist tendencies
in American culture. 1 It is safe to say that in America vitalism is not
dead.
I will argue in this essay that although uncompromising or absolute
vitalism is not ethically obligatory, vitalism is a relevant and ethically
permissible value to consider in treatment decisions for extremely
premature newborns (EPNs). 12 Both health professionals and parents
may be vitalists or appeal to vitalist values in reaching treatment
decisions. I interpret vitalism as a defensible value, one that has
ethical significance but which may be overridden by other ethical
values such as preventing excessive pain and suffering or reducing
serious psychological or economic costs. I will also argue that
treatment decisions for EPNs should take into consideration the
responsible recommendations of both health professionals and the
informed choices of parents, ideally resulting in a collaborative
consensus. Such treatment decisions should ordinarily be
individualized and contextualized on the basis of specific ethical
values rather than prescribed by legal rules. Legal regulation should
be invoked only to prevent arbitrary or abusive practices. If conflicts
arise between health professionals and parents over treatment
decisions for EPNs, attempts should be made to resolve them through
clear communication and non-adversarial negotiation or mediation. If
intractable value conflicts remain, then it may be necessary as a last
resort to turn to the courts for a ruling. However, it is my contention
that balancing ethical values rather than applying legal rules provides
a better way to reach sound, sensitive, and humane treatment
decisions.
11. See Stacey A. Tovino & William J. Winslade, A Primer on the Law and Ethics of Treatment,
Research, and Public Policy in the Context of Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1,
26-27 (2004); WILLIAM J. WINSLADE, CONFRONTING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY: DEVASTATION, HOPE
AND HEALING 117 (1998).
12. See Craig Conway, Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practical and Philosophical Influences
Impacting Medical Decisions Making on Behalf of Marginally-Viable Newborns 16 (Dec. 12, 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D., dissertation, University of Houston Law Center) (on file with author) (defining
EPNs as those generally less than twenty-seven weeks gestation and weighing less than 1000 grams).
[Vol. 25:4
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To support my claims I will discuss three cases in which I played a
peripheral role as an ethics consultant. These three cases will
illustrate why individualized, contextualized treatment decisions that
are ethically permissible (rather than obligatory) provide sound
guidance and sufficient justification for treatment decisions for EPNs.
I am in general agreement with the careflully reasoned position of
Loretta Kopelman.13 However, I prefer to characterize EPN treatment
decisions as being based not only on the best interests of the child but
also, at least to some degree, on the best interests of other relevant
parties-including parents and their families, health professionals,
hospitals, government agencies, and even local communities.
I. EXTREMELY PREMATURE NEWBORNS
The plight of the EPN continues to provoke much medical, ethical,
and legal controversy. 14 Survival alone is uncertain since EPNs
sometimes die quickly and approximately one-half die within a few
months. Of those who do survive, a spectrum of physical and mental
disabilities with varying degrees of severity are probable. 15 Few
EPNs are unaffected. Medical professionals and their practice
patterns, as well as hospital policies, are variable with regard to the
use of aggressive interventions versus comfort care only.
Some physicians are more or less inclined toward vitalism. Some
physicians and neonatal teams allocate more and others less authority
to parental preferences. Some physicians are more or less deferential
to hospital policies or CAPTA directives. Similarly, some parents
explicitly or implicitly endorse vitalism; others do not. Some parents
defer to physicians recommendations; others challenge them.
13. See generally Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or
Incapacitated Persons of All Ages, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 187 (2007); Loretta M. Kopelman, Baby
Doe Rules: In Reply, 116 PEDIATRICS 1602 (2005); Loretta M. Kopelman, Are the 21-Year Old Baby
Doe Rules Misunderstood or Mistaken?, 115 PEDIATRICS 797 (2005).
14. See generally Sadath A. Sayeed, The Marginally Viable Newborn: Legal Challenges, Conceptual
Inadequacies, and Reasonableness, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 600 (2006).
15. Georgie J. Annas, Extremely Preterm Birth and Parental Authority to Refuse Treatment--The
Case of Sidney Miller, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2118,2121 (2004).
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 935 2008-2009
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Hospitals vary in the degree of oversight or influence they exert
through their administrative or relevant committees on clinical
decisions. Multiple ethical issues arise regarding EPNs. Even in the
face of uncertainty of outcomes and variable values and practices of
interested parties, questions arise about the use of life-saving
resuscitation and continuation of life-sustaining treatment. Quality of
life criteria and sanctity of life values may come into conflict among
health professionals or between health professionals and parents or
even between parents themselves. Uncertainties are abundant about
the disabilities experienced by EPNs from the side effects of
procedures such as supplemental oxygen or the vulnerabilities of
premature organs. The psychological and economic burdens on
parents as well as caregivers of EPNs are profound. The influence of
hospital policies, guidelines from professional organizations, legal
regulations, and the fear of litigation contribute to the complexity and
compound the uncertainty of single treatment decisions as well as
ongoing treatment plans. This is only a partial list of the issues that
arise in the context of treatment decisions for EPNs.
Finally, before turning to the cases themselves, I have a few
comments about my role in the three cases. The first case deals with
the highly controversial, publicly debated, and judicially reviewed
case of Sidney Miller.1 6 In that situation I served as a paid consultant
to the parents of Sidney Miller during the litigation and jury trial of
Miller v. Hospital Corporation of America (HCA). I met and talked
with the Millers and their attorney, read the medical records and other
relevant documents, formulated opinions about ethical issues, and
was prepared to testify at the trial. Although I was present at the court
on the day I was expected to testify, a technical problem with my
designation as an expert precluded my participation. I did not serve as
an expert for the two subsequent cases decided by the Fourteenth
Court of Appeals of Texas17 and the Texas Supreme Court.'8 In the
second case I was an ethics consultant to the parents of an EPN. In
16. See infra Part Ill.
17. HCA, Inc. v. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App. 2000).
18. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. 2003).
|Vol. 25:4
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that role I counseled the parents, met as their representative with
several health professionals, negotiated obtaining a second opinion,
arranged a transfer of the infant from one hospital to another, and
helped to coordinate comfort care only. 19 In the third case I was an
ethics consultant to a utilization review company that advised an
insurance carrier about whether the medical care and the charges by
the physicians and the hospital were justified.20 This case involved an
ethics review of treatment decisions for an EPN who died after
approximately eight months of treatment. I reviewed all the medical
records in the case, read an expert report from a consulting
neonatologist physician, and wrote an opinion about ethical issues
that arose about the treatment decisions. In addition, I attended a
somewhat unusual, but intriguing, informal meeting and discussion
with representatives from the hospital staff and administration, the
external physician consultant, and representatives from the insurance
carrier (who observed but, except for brief comments, did not
participate in the discussion).
In each of the cases, I was a paid consultant to parties with specific
interests in the case. My perception, analysis, and evaluation of the
ethical issues were no doubt influenced by the role I was asked to
assume, but I tried to remain as objective as possible. This was easier
to do in the first and third cases. When I actually served in a
representative capacity for the parents, I also was their advocate and
agent as well as their counselor. Nevertheless, I attempted to serve as
an objective advisor with the responsibility to offer observations,
interpretations, and, in some instances, recommendations.
II. THE SIDNEY MILLER CASE
My references to "the Sidney Miller case,,21 include all the
circumstances leading up to and including Sidney's birth,
resuscitation, subsequent hospital treatment, court decisions, and
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See Conway, supra note 12, at 51-60.
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 937 2008-2009
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Sidney's life situation now, almost twenty years after her birth. The
case also refers to three judicial proceedings-the jury trial for
damages against the Hospital Corporation of America, a Texas Court
of Appeals decision, and the Texas Supreme Court decision.
Today, Sidney Miller is eighteen, yet she cannot walk, talk, feed
herself, or sit up on her own. She is legally blind in one eye, and has
a range of vision of only a few feet in the other. She suffers from
cerebral palsy, seizures, and spastic quad paresis in her limbs. She
has severe mental retardation and will have the mental capacity of an
infant for the remainder of her life. She has a surgically implanted
shunt in her skull to drain fluid leaking from her brain. She
periodically requires hospitalization to clean or replace the shunt.
And her family provides twenty-four hour care to change her diapers,
feed and clothe her, and take care of her needs. Sidney's condition
will never improve.
A. Sidney's Birth
On August 17, 1990, Karla Miller, accompanied by her husband,
Mark, was admitted to Woman's Hospital of Texas in Houston while
experiencing symptoms of premature labor. It was four months
before her scheduled due date. Physicians immediately administered
a drug to Karla to stop labor. Although her premature labor ceased,
physicians subsequently discovered that Karla had an infection
threatening to take her life and the life of her unborn daughter.
Karla's obstetrician, Mark Jacobs, M.D., and a neonatology resident,
Donald Kelley, M.D., informed Karla and Mark that the child would
need to be delivered soon to save the lives of both mother and child.
The physicians informed the couple that, even if born alive, the infant
would most likely suffer severe impairments including brain
hemorrhaging, blindness, lung disease, pulmonary infections, and
mental retardation.
After their discussion, Drs. Jacobs and Kelley asked the Millers to
decide whether the newborn should be aggressively treated upon
delivery. After deliberating, the Millers informed the physicians at
noon that "no heroic measures" were to be performed on the infant
[VoL 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 938 2008-2009
938  I E SITY   ( :  
'    
i i l i s-the   
t    
 
 ,  
,   
 
  
l   
r ll   
 
i lly      
    




   
   
 l   l   
  
 tl    
i    
'  ,  .,  
 .,   
  
      
    
i , , r   
l  
  
    l   
   
  t 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 16
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/16
20091 REFLECTIONS ON EXTREMELY PREMATURE NEWBORNS 939
and that the doctors should let "nature take its course." Dr. Kelley
recorded the Millers' request in the medical record, and Dr. Jacobs
informed other medical staff that no neonatologist would be needed
at delivery. Mark then left the hospital to make funeral arrangements
for the infant; he purchased a gown, a casket, and a burial plot.
Alarmed by the notation in the medical record, the nursing staff
notified other hospital personnel and administrators. An afternoon of
meetings ensued to discuss what should be done. An ultrasound
revealed that Karla's fetus weighed approximately 629 grams, or
slightly more than one pound, and had a gestational age of about
twenty-three weeks. Around 4:30 p.m. that afternoon, Mark was
advised by Anna Summerfield, administrative director of the neonatal
intensive care unit, that a hospital policy, as well as state and federal
law, required the hospital to resuscitate any infant born weighing
more than 500 grams. When a copy of the policy was requested by
Mark, he learned that it was an "unwritten" policy. When asked by
the Millers how they could prevent resuscitation and other measures
from being taken on the newborn, hospital officials informed them
that they would need to transfer Karla to another facility. However,
Karla's obstetrician had made it clear that transfer was not a viable
option given Karla's infection and worsening condition.
What concerned the physicians, as well as the hospital
administrators, was the ethical dilemma of not providing any medical
treatment without first observing the newborn's condition. As Dr.
Jacobs testified:
[W]hat we [an ad hoc hospital committee] finally decided that
everyone wanted to do was to not make the call prior to the time
we actually saw the baby. Deliver the baby, because you see
there was this [question] is the baby really 23 weeks, or is the
baby further along, how big is the baby, what are we dealing
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 939 2008-2009
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with. We decided to let the neonatologist make the call by
looking directly at the baby at birth.22
Dr. Jacobs reversed the earlier medical record and wrote that a plan
of evaluation would begin upon the birth of the newborn. The
Millers, however, still refused to consent to resuscitation or other
medical treatment to be provided to the infant at birth.
That evening, Karla's amniotic sac broke and physicians
determined that labor would need to be induced to prevent further
complications. At 11:30 p.m. that night, Karla delivered a premature
female infant weighing 615 grams, whom the Millers named Sidney.
Sidney's gestational age was twenty-three and one-seventh weeks.
The neonatologist, Eduardo Otero, M.D., noted that Sidney had a
heart beat, "was blue in color and limp, gasped for air, spontaneously
cried, and grimaced., 23 The physician also noted that Sidney
displayed no dysmorphic features other than being premature; he
immediately "bagged" and "intubated" Sidney and placed her on
ventilation.24 When asked at trial why, the physician responded:
Because this baby is alive and this is a baby that has a reasonable
chance of living. And again, this is a baby that is not necessarily
going to have problems later on. There are babies that survive at
this gestational age, that-with this birth weight, that later on go
on and do well.25
Otero's testimony obviously conflicted with the medical opinions
previously given to the Millers before Sidney's birth. Yet neither
Karla nor Mark objected further at the time the treatment was
administered by Otero. They felt they had already expressed their
refusal and had no other realistic options.
22. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 762.
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Sidney initially responded well to treatment, but within the first
few days after birth, she suffered a serious brain hemorrhage-a
common occurrence in extremely premature infants. It was unclear
whether the hemorrhage resulted from the medical treatment
provided or in spite of it. But as originally predicted by her
physicians, Sidney suffered all the severe physical and mental
impairments that remain with her today.
B. The Lawsuit
Karla and Mark Miller sued The Woman's Hospital of Texas and
its parent company, HCA, and subsidiaries, asserting claims of
negligence, gross negligence, battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and the tort of wrongful birth. The Millers decided
not to pursue legal action against any of the physicians, including
neonatologist Eduardo Otero, who performed the life-sustaining
treatment despite Mark Miller's objections. When asked by the media
why they chose not to bring suit against the physicians, Mark Miller
responded that he and Karla believed "the doctors just did what they
were told" to do by hospital officials. The physicians were involved
in the litigation to the extent that it was alleged they acted as the
agents of the hospital, so the hospital was legally responsible for their
actions.
After approximately a one-month trial, the jury found that
resuscitation had been performed on Sidney without the consent of
the Millers and that the negligence of the hospital and HCA
"proximately caused the occurrence in question." Additionally, the
jury concluded that both HCA and the hospital were grossly
negligent, that the hospital acted with malice, and that Dr. Otero was
the hospital's agent in the resuscitation of Sidney. The jury awarded
the Millers $29,400,000 in actual damages, $17,503,066 in
prejudgment interest, and $13,500,000 in punitive damages.
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C. The Appeal and Opinion of the Texas Supreme Court
A Texas Court of Appeals reversed the jury's award and ordered
the Millers to take nothing. The three-judge court concluded that,
pursuant to state law, parents could withhold medical treatment from
a child only if the child's condition was deemed "terminal. 26 But in
Sidney's case, the court noted there was no authority allowing a
parent to "withhold [urgently-needed life-sustaining medical]
treatment from a non-terminally ill child., 27 Thus, according to the
majority opinion, HCA and the hospital were under no duty to follow
the Millers' instruction to withhold resuscitation or to have a policy
prohibiting resuscitation of newborns like Sidney without parental
consent. One dissenting justice disagreed and stated that a court order
was required to override the Millers' refusal and to determine what
was in Sidney's best interests.
The Texas Supreme Court limited its role in the matter to
"determine the respective roles that parents and healthcare providers
play in deciding whether to treat an infant who is born alive but in
distress and is so premature that, despite advancements in neonatal
intensive care, has a largely uncertain prognosis., 28  After
summarizing existing law allowing parents the authority to make
health care decisions on behalf of their children, the court noted that
such parental autonomy has its limits.29 The court noted that the state
punishes parents only for what amounts to child abuse or child
neglect and that "as long as parents choose from professionally
accepted treatment options the choice is rarely reviewed in court."
30
Thus, absent evidence of abuse or neglect, a parent has the right to
give or withhold consent for medical treatment for a child.3 1
26. HCA, 36 S.W.3d at 193.
27. Id. at 194.
28. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 766.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 767.
31. Id. at 766 (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 n. 13 (1986)).
[Vol. 25:4
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However, the court went on to acknowledge that there are
exceptions. 32 In those circumstances, the court held:
[A] physician, who is confronted with emergent circumstances
and provides life-sustaining treatment to a minor child, is not
liable for not first obtaining consent from the parents .... [This
is] an exception to the general rule that a physician
commits a battery by providing medical treatment without
consent. As such, the exception is narrowly circumscribed and
arises only in emergent circumstances when there is no time to
consult the parents or seek court intervention ....
In other words, physicians will not be legally liable for erring on the
side of preservation of life in emergencies. In disagreeing with the
Millers' contention that Sidney's birth was not an "emergent
circumstance" and that there was plenty of time to seek a court order,
the court concluded that the circumstances were unique, in that a
decision about resuscitation could not reasonably be made before
birth.34 The court noted:
[T]he evidence established that Sidney could only be properly
evaluated when she was born. Any decision the Millers made
before Sidney's birth concerning her treatment at or after her
birth would necessarily be based on speculation. . . . [A]
decision [made before birth] could not control whether the
circumstances facing Dr. Otero were emergent because it would
not have been a fully informed one according to the evidence in
this case.35
The court held that the actions of Dr. Otero were not negligent
because he was required to "make a split-second decision ... [and
32. Id. at 767.
33. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 767-68.
34. Id. at 769.
35. Id.
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even though] the Millers were both present in the delivery room,
there was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment or to
institute legal proceedings.. ,,36
Throughout the legal proceedings, HCA had consistently argued
that the federal Baby Doe Rules37 forbade any denial of medical
treatment based on quality of life considerations. The healthcare
corporation argued that the rules were "scrupulously followed" and
"faithful adherence to the public policy established by the regulations
should not be thwarted through civil liability in damages."
38
Although the court agreed in spirit, it went on to note that the rules
required Texas to "provide a mechanism by which the child
protective services system [could] initiate legal proceedings to
prevent the withholding of medical treatment from infants."39 But it
was clear that neither the hospital nor HCA requested child protective
services to initiate legal proceedings to override the Millers' decision
to withhold treatment. The court affirmed the appellate court's
judgment, declining to impose liability for battery or negligence on a
physician acting on behalf of the hospital for providing life-
sustaining treatment under emergent circumstances to an infant
without parental consent.
D. Discussion
Recall that Drs. Jacobs and Kelley first requested the Millers
decide whether to attempt resuscitation if Sidney was born alive.
Given the fact that Dr. Jacobs told the Millers that Sidney's birth
should be viewed as a "tragic miscarriage," 40 it is not surprising that
Mark left to make funeral arrangements. In 1990, more so than it is
now, mortality for a twenty-three week fetus was highly probable at
birth or soon thereafter even with resuscitation and LST. In fact, at
36. Id.
37. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457,98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (2006) and implemented in relevant part by 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15).
38. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 771.
39. Id.
40. Kathryn Casey, Born Too Soon, LADIES HOME J., Aug. 1998, at 53.
[Vol. 25:4
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the jury trial, a physician from Johns Hopkins testified that the
resuscitation and subsequent treatment was experimental and beyond
the standard of care for such an EPN. Not only did the Millers not
consent to resuscitation, they were not even informed that any of the
treatment of Sidney might be classified as experimental. The jury
accepted the expert's opinion and, in part on that basis, awarded the
Millers punitive damages.
Quite apart from the experimentation issue, it was my opinion
then, as it is now, that it was ethically permissible for the Millers, on
the basis of the information provided by their physicians, to choose
not to have a neonatologist present and not to attempt resuscitation or
LST. I think it was also ethically permissible for the physicians to
accept the Millers' decision. The Millers did not want to put their
unborn child at risk for the predicted disabilities, pain, and suffering
that did in fact ensue. They relied in good faith on what indeed was
reliable information and a prediction about outcomes. Given the
uncertainty of survival and the probability of severe disability, it was
reasonable and responsible for the Millers to opt for no resuscitation
which they understood to be "heroic measures."
However, if the Millers had listened carefully to their physicians
and then after deliberation said, "Well, if our baby is born alive, we
want you to resuscitate her at birth," that would also have been
ethically permissible. The Millers might have based such a decision
on vitalism, religious faith, hope, or gambling against the odds that
she would not suffer severe impairments. If the Millers had chosen
resuscitation at birth, it would have been medically and ethically
obligatory for a neonatologist to be present.
Another ethical issue arose after Sidney suffered a grade IV
intracranial brain bleed that probably caused her other severe
disabilities. It was noted in the Texas Supreme Court decision that the
Millers did not object to subsequent treatment.41 However, there is
more to the story. First, the Millers told me that they were never
offered an option to limit aggressive care and initiate comfort care
41. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 763.
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only. In fact, on the fourth day after her birth, the Millers asked if
Sidney could be taken off of life support. "The doctors told us it
would be incredibly painful for Sidney," Karla recalls, "and then it
could take a long time for her to die. ' 42 The Millers claim they were
told by the doctors that they had no choice about whether to terminate
the life support. In addition, the Millers say they were led to believe
that subsequent treatment would reduce Sidney's pain and suffering.
It would have been ethically permissible to shift from aggressive LST
to comfort care only.
After Sidney's prolonged hospitalization and devastating
disabilities made her prognosis so grim, the Millers took Sidney
home. Immense burdens were imposed on the Millers to care for her.
At great personal and economic sacrifice, the Millers changed their
life to fulfill her needs. Although Sidney has major physical
disabilities and minimal mental capacities, she is conscious and does
respond to her parents. The large jury award for medical expenses
was no doubt influenced by the enormous financial burdens the
Millers initially incurred and the continuing costs of her care. Some
families might not have been willing or able to endure the emotional
costs of twenty-four hour care of a severely handicapped child with
no prospect of improvement.43 The Millers have devoted themselves
42. Casey, supra note 40, at 53.
43. About five years ago, I was asked to intervene as a consultant to a private hospital in a western
state. An infant was unexpectedly born prematurely, suffering from multiple genetic anomalies. The
infant's mother was devastated; her husband and family were so disturbed that they refused to come to
the hospital to see the baby. The attending neonatologist was sympathetic to the mother's distress. The
neonatologist, without consultation with anyone else, responded to the mother's distress by giving the
infant, at the mother's request, a lethal injection that the physician documented in the medical record. A
nurse who read the note the next morning reported it to the hospital administration. The hospital
reported it to the medical board and the district attorney investigated the incident. The neonatologist,
who had an excellent reputation in the community, initially believed that his decision was justified and
was shocked that his action was called into question. After negotiations with the medical board and the
district attorney, the hospital administration reached an agreement to provide a comprehensive education
program for the staff and a special tutorial for the neonatologist. Upon completion of both phases, the
state agencies agreed that no further action would be taken. It was my assignment to provide the
education program and the special tutorial. It was difficult as an outside consultant to address the many
emotional issues, the political undertones, the ethical conflicts, and the legal issues. Because the
hospital-wide education program was mandated rather than voluntary, passive and active resistance to
my presence was no surprise to me. The neonatologist was also a reluctant, but contrite, participant
because he knew that euthanasia was illegal. He also realized that his impulsive response to the mother's
[Vol. 25:4
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to providing extraordinary care for Sidney in their home when some
parents might have placed such a child in a state institution.
Turning to the neonatal physicians that cared for Sidney after her
resuscitation, what obligations did they have to Sidney or her
parents? At the very least, the physicians had a duty to fully inform
the Millers about the consequences of continuing the LST. The
Millers should have had an opportunity to consider comfort care
only, but that option was never offered to them. Perhaps the
physicians marginalized the Millers because of their attempt to refuse
resuscitation. Neonatal intensive care in 1990 often marginalized, if
not excluded, parents from participating in ongoing treatment
decisions other than to routinely sign consent forms. The Millers, in
retrospect, realized that they were denied informed consent. Perhaps
also the neonatologists were motivated by what I call technological
vitalism-using LST to keep an infant alive even if this is the only
realistic goal of medicine that can be achieved. It would have been
ethically permissible for the physicians, with the Millers' informed
consent, to provide less aggressive or even comfort care only when
Sidney's prognosis greatly worsened. In fact, I suggested to the
Millers' attorney that he consider including the failure to inform the
Millers about their ethical option to refuse continued aggressive LST
in the lawsuit. Although he agreed with my ethical analysis, the
lawsuit was limited to the parents' explicit refusal of resuscitation,
the hospital's unwritten resuscitation policy, and its failure to get
third-party authorization to override the parents' refusal.
distress was unwise, but he was not easily convinced that it was unethical. He also resented the
involuntary tutorial. My own reaction to the situation was concern that so many health professionals
failed to appreciate the complexity and ambiguity of the entire sequence of events. The participants
retreated into oversimplification, and polarization of the issues made it virtually impossible for me to
engage the participants in a meaningful dialogue, or effective education. I did my best to overcome their
resistances, but the circumstances made the task extremely difficult. Although the hospital
administration was relieved and the state agencies signed off, I was dubious about whether my efforts
were effective or merely tolerated as a pragmatic necessity. It came as no surprise when I later learned
that the neonatologist had resigned and moved away. I recommended to the hospital administration that
an involuntary "education" intervention should be followed by a more reflective and systematic
approach to continuing professional education. I wondered whether my recommendation would be taken
seriously. I have no reason to believe or evidence that it was. I hope I am wrong.
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The hospital policy invoked in the Miller case was problematic for
another reason. The resuscitation of any EPN who weighs more than
500 grams may save a newborn's life only to condemn it to a quality
of life diminished by devastating disabilities. Such an unwavering
commitment to resuscitation may shield an institution and its
physicians from allegations that they did not do enough to save a life.
But it is also an unwarranted pursuit of vitalism-attempting to save
lives regardless of excessive emotional and economic costs with
often disastrous consequences for the patients and their families.
Vitalism motivated by fear of litigation is a bad reason for action and
a dangerous policy. It is likely that this factor contributed to the
decision of the ad hoc hospital committee to disregard what the
physicians originally told the Millers and the Millers' refusal of
resuscitation.
The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals agreed with the
Millers that HCA and the hospital had the time and an obligation to
seek a court order to overrule the parents' refusal of resuscitation.44
This was especially important because the physicians initially offered
the Millers the option to refuse. The hospital's later unilateral
decision to resuscitate Sidney at birth if she was born alive, even
though ruled legal by the Texas Supreme Court, was, I believe,
arrogant and unethical. William Silverman, who is one of the
founders of modern neonatology, once said that his colleagues in
neonatology are driven not only by arrogance but also by a "rescue
fantasy" that fails to consider the costs or consequences for the
family of the premature infants.45 George Annas points out that the
Texas Supreme Court's opinion in the Miller case authorizes only the
46hospital's unilateral resuscitation. Annas correctly observes that the
court made no ruling about what the physicians are permitted or
required to do after the emergency resuscitation. 47 John Robertson, in
44. HCA, 36 S.W.3d at 198 (Amidei, J., dissenting).
45. William A. Silverman, Mismatched Attitudes About Neonatal Death, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
6, 15-16 (Dec. 1981).
46. Annas, supra note 15, at 2120.
47. Id. at 2123.
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a comprehensive review of CAPTA and a detailed discussion of the
Miller case, recommends that any aggressive treatment after
emergency resuscitation should respect the parents' "presumptive
right" to make treatment decisions for their child's welfare. 48 If
physicians desire to continue to treat and the parents object, the
burden of proof should be on physicians to obtain legal authorization
to override parental refusal.49 True, CAPTA endorses a nearly
unqualified vitalism limited only by infants who are dying or lack
consciousness. But for the physicians and the hospital to act
unilaterally under the dubious authority of an unwritten and belatedly
disclosed hospital policy only pays lip service to CAPTA. Even if
one agrees with CAPTA (which I do not), oversight from the state
child abuse agency was meant to apply to physicians and hospitals as
well as parents.
III. THE BABY C CASE
Shortly after the jury trial in the Miller case, I was approached by a
colleague who knew that I had been a consultant for the Millers. My
colleague mentioned that he knew a young couple who had an EPN
who was born and in treatment at the same hospital as Sidney Miller.
He asked me if I would meet and talk with the parents. Although
ordinarily I serve as an ethics consultant only to health professionals
or hospitals, I agreed to talk with his friends. I was distressed to learn
from them that they had an EPN born at twenty-five weeks weighing
less than 1000 grams who suffered a grade IV brain bleed and
vulnerable to the same disabilities as Sidney. However, this couple
had an older child, then eighteen months, who was born less
prematurely (thirty-one weeks) and successfully treated at the same
hospital. The parents initially assumed that the neonatal course of
treatment for their second son, where he had been hospitalized for
about two months, would not pose any problems. A pediatric
48. John A. Robertson, Extreme Prematurity and Parental Rights Afier Baby Doe, 34 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 32, 38 (2004).
49. Id.
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neurologist explained to the parents all the severe disabilities likely to
result from the brain bleeds. At that point the parents were concerned;
the husband talked with his two sisters from the East Coast, one of
whom was an adult neurologist and the other a general internist. The
sisters expressed alarm about the report from the pediatric
neurologist. They also inquired about neonatal practices in their
community where neonatal teams continually reassessed treatment
plans, discussed them with the parents, and made joint decisions.
They were surprised to learn that their brother and his wife, both
school teachers, had so little knowledge, involvement, or
participation in the treatment discussions.
When the parents met with me, they asked if I would serve as their
representative to find out what was going on with their son. Although
they had visited the neonatal nursery, they were intimidated and felt
hesitant to raise questions. In particular, they did not want to create
conflicts at the hospital where their older son received medical care.
They authorized and asked me to speak to the neonatal staff on their
behalf. With the assistance and intervention of a colleague, I was able
to talk with a nurse and a resident who were specifically involved
with their son's care. I also met with the physician who was the Chief
of Neonatology. The nurse and the resident painted a grim picture of
the infant's future; it sounded eerily similar to Sidney Miller. But the
Chief of Neonatology tried to assure me that the infant was stable. I
asked specifically if the infant was terminally ill or on a dying
trajectory. The Chief adamantly denied that this was the case. After
what I had been told by the nurse and the resident, however, I was
dubious.
As it happened, I personally knew the hospital risk manager who
was also an attorney. I explained the situation to him and indicated
that the parents wanted to obtain a second opinion. I made it clear
that the parents did not want to disrupt their relationship with the
hospital or to cause trouble. The risk manager complied by sending
the medical records to a neonatologist who I knew well as a
conservative, vitalist-leaning physician. When she reviewed the
records, she was convinced that the infant had a very poor prognosis
[Vol. 25:4
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if not a terminal condition. Of course, given the uncertainty of
predictions of mortality, she qualified her opinion; she was more
certain of the prognosis of severe morbidities. After further
discussion with the consulting neonatologist and a pediatric
intensivist who directed a pediatric hospice, a decision was made to
offer the parents the option of transferring their son to the pediatric
hospice for comfort care only. Although the parents were stunned and
ambivalent after talking with the husband's physician-sisters, they
decided to request a transfer. With the cooperation of the treating
hospital's risk manager, a transfer was made to the pediatric hospice.
The infant, who was still on a ventilator, barely survived the
transport of about fifty miles. Gathered together in the pediatric
hospice were the infant, his parents, the husband's two sisters,
physicians and nurses from the hospice, clergy, and at my suggestion,
the eighteen-month-old son. After introductions and some
preliminary discussion, a decision was made to remove the ventilator
that had been sustaining Baby C's respiration. It was the first time
that Baby C's parents had seen his face unencumbered by the
ventilator. The parents took pictures for their family history and to
capture the brief time that he was able to breathe on his own. Twenty
minutes later, he died. Although his death was sad and difficult,
because it was not unexpected the family was prepared and able to
cope with it. When I visited with them on the anniversary of Baby
C's death, they remained sad but relieved that he had a peaceful,
though untimely, death.
If Baby C had remained at the first hospital, he may have survived
and suffered a fate similar to Sidney Miller. Or, contrary to the
assertion of the Chief of Neonatology, he may have passed away in
spite of LST. If the parents had been told about and appreciated their
option to continue LST, it would not have been unethical for the
physicians to do so. But, it was clear to me that the parents had not
really been adequately informed about, much less understood, their
son's precarious and fragile condition. They had been kept in the dark
by peremptory reassurances that everything was stable. Because the
parents were not assertive or probing, they at first accepted the
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 951 2008-2009
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reassurances at face value. Although the report from the pediatric
neurologist startled and frightened them, they were more fortunate
than many parents to have access to helpful family members and my
consultation. My personal contacts in the hospital gave me not only
access to information but also an ability to negotiate on behalf of the
parents. In the.end they were able to make a difficult and painful-
but well-informed--decision to seek comfort care only rather than
aggressive LST. The outcome of the treatment decisions for Baby C
obviously differed from the results in the Miller case. In my opinion,
it was ethically and legally appropriate to seek and rely on a second
professional opinion and alternative treatment plan in view of the
uncertain prognosis. Once the parents were fully informed about their
son's prognosis, it was ethically permissible for them to opt for
comfort care only and discontinue ventilator support. Although
disagreements arose between the parents and the original neonatology
treatment team, they were resolved without resorting to litigation or
legal rulings.
IV. BABY V
In this case, my role as an ethics consultant was unusual in that I
was engaged by a company that provides utilization review for a
large medical insurance group. I was asked to examine the complete
medical records of a male neonate born in November 2005 at a
gestational age of almost twenty-six weeks at a birth weight of 760
grams. In addition, a clinical assessment of his treatment from a
consulting neonatologist hired by the company was provided to me.
My responsibilities were to identify and evaluate ethical issues
manifested in the medical records and brought out by the expert
report from the neonatologist. I organized the ethics review in terms
of the heuristic framework of Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach
to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine.50 This framework
50. See generally A.R. JONSEN, M. SIEGLER & W.J. WINSLADE, CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (6th ed. 2006).
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considers medical indications and the goals of medicine, patient (here
parental) preferences, quality of life, and contextual features.
A. Medical Indications
The consulting neonatologist described in detail the many medical
problems faced by this premature infant-infections, renal
insufficiency, brain bleeds, chronic lung disease, and cystic fibrosis.
The parents of Baby V, after a month of neonatal intensive care at his
birth hospital, were advised of V's dire prognosis. They then
transferred him to a tertiary care hospital well equipped and willing
to treat seriously compromised infants. Despite an aggressive
treatment plan that used state-of-the-art medical technology, V
remained critically ill, suffering from chronic lung disease. During
nearly eight months of treatment, he remained ventilator-dependent-
except for approximately two weeks from late February to early
March 2006. After continued complex, aggressive treatment, by mid-
April an attending physician informed the parents that Baby V's
chronic lung condition was irreversible and that it was highly
probable, if he survived, that he would remain ventilator-dependent.
At that point, the attending physician recommended a Do Not
Resuscitate order (DNR) in the event of respirator or cardiac arrest.
After prolonged deliberation, the parents refused and requested
continued aggressive care. Finally, a few days before Baby V died-
approximately three months later-the parents accepted some limits
on aggressive treatments. Even so, it was noted in the records that
Baby V's father inquired about a lung transplant shortly before V
died. It was unclear whether the father's remark was a serious request
or only a hope for a miracle. From the moment of birth, this
premature infant had an extremely poor prognosis. This was
reiterated after two months by the physicians and the hospital where
he was born. Like others who evaluated this case, I believed that the
prolonged treatment of Baby V was excessive.
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B. Parents 'Preferences
It is clear from the medical records that V's parents requested
continued life-prolonging procedures, and it was repeatedly noted
that they remained "hopeful" and "optimistic" about V's long-term
survival. The records do not describe the details of the conversations
of the physicians with the parents, nor do the records describe
whether the parents understood or accepted V's extremely poor
prognosis for long-term survival. There is no mention in the records
of any use of ethics consultation or ethics committees to evaluate the
circumstances of this case. It seems to me that some such
consultation was at least desirable, if not necessary, to determine if
the parents were adequately informed and able to appreciate the
situation. It was the ethical responsibility of physicians not only to
fully disclose V's diagnoses and prognosis to the parents, but also to
educate them about whether their hopes and optimism were realistic
or unrealistic. It is always difficult to communicate to the parents of a
critically ill infant that life-prolonging procedures may not be
providing any other therapeutic benefits and may only be postponing
the death of an infant on a dying trajectory. However difficult that
may be to confront, physicians have a responsibility to disclose in a
sensitive manner what may be a painful truth to the parents. The
parents do not have the right to demand the impossible and the
physicians have no duty to attempt it. It is unclear from the records in
their case whether the physicians continued the aggressive and
excessive treatment merely because the parents requested it or
whether the physicians believed in good faith that the treatment was
medically indicated and potentially beneficial to V. Whenever the
parents were approached about limiting treatment, they resisted it
until shortly before V's death. However, it is the ethical responsibility
of the physicians to recommend and advise the parents that if no
therapeutic benefits other than life-prolongation can be achieved,
comfort care only is a medically appropriate option. It is questionable
whether the many other interventions, especially after April 11, 2006,
provided any significant therapeutic benefits. One of the grave
dangers of the prolonged administration of life support technologies
[Vol. 25:4
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in cases of critically ill premature infants is that it may create or
reinforce false hopes and unwarranted optimism on the part of the
parents. Physicians have a duty to sensitively but candidly dispel
mistaken beliefs and resist unwarranted requests. It is not clear that
the physicians in this case adequately explained, advised, or
recommended to the parents that, although continued aggressive
treatment of V was permissible, it was also unlikely to achieve long-
term survival.
C. Quality of Life
There was scant evidence in this case that V's quality of life was
improved or enhanced by the treatments he received. Although
sedation reduced V's pain and suffering, there is little evidence of
significant therapeutic benefits. The enormous economic costs, the
physical burdens on V, and the emotional burdens on the parents and
the health professionals outweighed any benefits that V received
other than a brief extension of his life. It would have been ethically
permissible to limit or even withdraw life support long before V died.
D. Contextual Features
Several contextual features of this case raise serious ethical
questions. Why did the parents insist that aggressive, or even
excessive, treatment be given to V? Were they in denial or captivated
by irrational beliefs? Why did the physicians continue aggressive
care even though it resulted in no significant improvement in V's
condition? Why were so many expensive and invasive treatments
given when they provided so few therapeutic benefits? Did the
physicians merely capitulate to the parents' demands without
challenging them? Was the treatment in this case an appropriate use
of limited medical resources? Was the treatment continued only
because it was anticipated that the cost of care would be covered by
third-party payments? To what extent did the physicians attempt to
persuade or negotiate with the parents about limiting treatment?
Although I cannot fully answer these questions-because only
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cryptic notes were made regarding these questions-I strongly
suspect that the extensive, expensive, and aggressive treatment, at
least after April 11, 2006, was not medically required, indicated, or
therapeutically useful (except to prolong the dying process of V). It
is, of course, impossible to discern the motives of the parents or the
physicians merely from the documents provided. It is my opinion that
from a clinical ethical perspective, the sustained course of aggressive
life-sustaining treatment, with so few therapeutic benefits, was
neither ethically required nor ethically justified. But it was ethically
permissible if the parents, after being adequately informed, espoused
vitalist values and were willing to deal with possible consequences
such as permanent ventilator dependence as well as economic and
emotional burdens. If the physicians believed that it was medically
appropriate and agreed with the parents about continuing LST, then it
is ethically permissible even if others would disagree.
E. Resolution of the Case
Although I wondered what, if anything, was happening with regard
to this case, several months went by before I received any further
communications. Then I received copies of two letters, one from a
physician and another from a hospital administrator that disputed my
opinions as well as those of the neonatologist consultant. I wrote a
response to those letters and I assumed that my role in this case was
finished.
Much to my surprise, I later received a call asking me whether I
would be willing to participate, along with the neonatologist
consultant, in an informal meeting with physicians and the hospital
administrator to clarify a number of issues and to better understand
the treatment of Baby V. I also understood that representatives from
the benefits administration company and others from the hospital
might attend the meeting as observers. But no lawyers from either
side were to be present and no transcript of the meeting would be
made.
The underlying issue in this case was whether the full $2.8 million
that had been billed to the parents' insurance carrier was fully
[Vol. 25:4
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justified. The benefits administrators wondered whether certain
treatments were appropriate, whether the hospital had followed its
own protocol once a disagreement arose between the attending
physician and the parents with regard to the DNR order, and whether
the LST had been excessive and inappropriate. I was fascinated by
the idea of the informal meeting and certainly willing to participate.
When the meeting was held at the hospital in question, one of the
first things I noticed, as I was walking down the hall to the meeting
was a familiar name on one of the office doors. It was a physician
ethics consultant that I have known for many years. What a
coincidence, I thought. When I entered the room for the meeting, I
was surprised to see the ethics consultant because his name had never
appeared in any of the records I reviewed.
The meeting was very cordial but everyone was cautious and chose
their words carefully. The hospital physicians explained their
rationale for aggressive LST. The palliative care physician told us
how he could work to reduce pain and suffering while the
neonatologists continued the aggressive LST. I asked the ethics
consultant if he had been involved with this case. He said that no
formal consultation had been requested; he just knew about the case
through the hospital grapevine. I wondered why he was attending the
meeting, but the question was not addressed. In any event, I did ask
whether there was further information about the parents' preferences
or the basis for their hope and optimism. But no new information was
provided. I asked why the physician who recommended the DNR
order was not at the meeting with us. The curious response was that
he was just unable to be there. I thought it odd that such a key person,
who could have shed light on a number of the ethical issues raised in
my letter, was not present.
I did learn at the meeting that the hospital policy and apparently
the law in the state was that LST for infants may not be terminated
upon a physician's recommendation unless the parents give their
informed consent. Since the parents did not agree to the DNR or any
other limits on treatment until shortly before Baby V died, as far as
the hospital and the physicians were concerned that was the end of
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the matter. I felt, however, that information about what the parents
were told or not told about Baby V's condition and his prognosis was
essential to an assessment of the issue of informed consent.
As I mentioned previously, the underlying issue and subtext of the
informal meeting was whether the full $2.8 million billed to the
insurance company was warranted. The billing issues were not
discussed in our informal meeting. However, it did seem to me that
the unanswered questions relevant to informed consent-the parents'
understanding of Baby V's prognosis, and what I would call
therapeutic extravagance-might have a bearing on subsequent
negotiations. Perhaps ethically permissible aggressive treatment was
provided by the physicians and accepted by the parents during the
eight months of care. But it is not clear, given all the unanswered
questions, incomplete data, and conflicting values that the treatment
was ethically justified on rational grounds. In addition, it is difficult
to justify the extraordinary economic costs and other burdens of the
prolonged treatment. I subsequently learned that the dispute between
the hospital and the insurance company was settled informally
without litigation.
CONCLUSION
In this essay I have argued that vitalism is an ethically relevant
value that may support the use of aggressive LST in EPNs. But I have
also argued that it is ethically permissible in some circumstances to
withhold or withdraw aggressive LST and to override vitalist values.
The three cases I have presented illustrate a variety of different
issues. I believe that treatment decisions concerning EPNs ideally
should seek a proper balance of medical indications, parents'
preferences, quality of life, and contextual features considered in the
light of the nuances of particular cases.
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